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SOME THOUGHTS ON LABOR
ARBITRATION
JEROME S. RUBENSTEIN*
I
In three decisions handed down in 1960 the Supreme Court con-
ferred plenary indulgence upon the practice of labor arbitration; de-
scribed the circumstances under which arbitration might be compelled;
and sought to define the scope of the arbitrator's power. In United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.' and United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.2 the Court ordered arbitration of
grievances that may have been outside the arbitrator's power to re-
dress ;3 and in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.4
the majority asserted that "refusal of courts to review the merits of
an arbitration award is the proper approach,"5 thereby practically
eliminating the unsuccessful party's opportunity to obtain relief from
an erroneous award. More recently, the Court held that under proper
circumstances an employer's damage suit may be stayed pending ar-
bitration ;6 that agreement between an employer and union to arbitrate
* Member of the New York bar.
1363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2363 U.S. 574 (1960).
3 The grievant in American Mfg. was an employee who had been injured at
work; successfully prosecuted a workmen's compensation claim to a settle-
ment predicated upon a finding that he was 25% "permanently partially dis-
abled"; and then demanded to be returned to his old job. In ordering arbi-
tration of this grievance the Court's majority observed:
"The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely
those which the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even
frivolous claims may have therapeutic value of which those who are not
a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware." Id. at 568.
The collective bargaining agreement in Warrior & Gulf exempted from
arbitration "matters which are strictly a function of management." The union
grieved against the employer's subcontracting of maintenance work that had
been customarily performed by members of the bargaining unit; and the
employer contended that this grievance was not subject to arbitration because
it involved a decision which was "strictly a function of management." In
ordering arbitration of this grievance the Court observed the impossibility
of reducing to writing all the various agreements that may exist between an
employer and a union in a large industrial enterprise; characterized the
written collective agreement as "a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate"; (Id. at 578) and
empowered arbitrators to interpret and declare the "common law of the shop"
(Id. at 580). As common-law judge the arbitrator presumptively has juris-
diction to hear any question affecting the parties' relationship, unless it is
manifest from their "generalized code" that he is powerless to entertain the
question put to him. Thus:
"Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the
questions on which the parties disagree must therefore come within the
scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agree-
ment." Id. at 581.
4363 U.S. 593 (1960).
5 Id. at 596.6 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers
International, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
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grievances ncessarily implies a "no-strike" covenant coextensive with
the scope of arbitrability ;7 and, oddly, that the survivor of a cor-
porate merger may be compelled to arbitrate, as under a collective
bargaining agreement, with the union that had represented the em-
ployees of a company that ceased to exist as a separate entity in the
merger, even though the collective bargaining agreement did not by
express provision bind that company's successorsY
At the bottom of the Supreme Court's fondness for the arbitral
process would seem to be the notion that in some way labor arbitration
transcends the mere resolution of contractual disputes and indeed
authorizes the playing of King Solomon. Although the majority opin-
ions in the Steelworkers trilogy disclaim such an attitude, analysis of
their text demonstrates that it is in fact operative.
In Enterprise Mr. Justice Doglas wrote:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only
so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity
to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforce-
ment of the award."
9
One difficulty immediately suggests itself. Suppose a collective agree-
ment were to contain, in its grievance and arbitration article, some-
thing like the following:
The arbitrator shall not have the authority to add to, subtract
from, or in any way modify any of the provisions of this
agreement; and in rendering an award shall base his decision
upon the facts presented to him by the parties, upon his own
knowledge of industrial practices in the Company's establishment
covered by this agreement, and upon customarily accepted stand-
ards of industrial usage.
Certainly this type of provision would authorize the arbitrator to
go far beyond the written terms of the contract in reaching his de-
cision; under such a provision it would seem that he might properly
find that no agreement-whether written or the product of the parties'
own practicel°--existed under which the particular dispute might be
resolved, and yet proceed to dictate to the parties what their course of
conduct should be. The arbitrator would thus be empowered to "dis-
pense his own brand of industrial justice," but an award predicated
7 Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).8 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 373 U.S. 543 (1964).
9 363 U.S. at 597.
10 See, for example, ?'Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1017 (1961).
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upon such an exercise of power would obviously draw its "essence"
from the agreement and therefore be immune from attack.
Most collective bargaining agreements that provide for arbitration
contain a provision narrower than this hypothetical one. Almost uni-
versal is the following provision or some slight variant thereof: "The
arbitrator shall not have the authority to add to, subtract from, or in
any way modify any of the provisions of this agreement." Such boiler-
plate language'1 will not prevent most arbitrators from enforcing as
a contractual obligation a long-standing practice that is not mentioned
in the text of the collective bargaining agreement, if the practice
can be found to be of benefit to employees in the bargaining unit.
Among such practices are the conferring of room allowances upon
certain employees,' 2 free coffee or paid coffee breaks, 13 Christmas
bonuses, 14 paid meal periods,15 free meals,'" paid wash-up time,'7 pay
for time spent in the processing of grievances, 8 and the number of
rest periods per day.'9 The absence of any contractual provision con-
cerning the retention of past practices does not seem to affect their en-
forceability.2 0
"An almost identical provision appears in the agreement before the Court in
the American Mfg. case, 363 U.S. at 565.
12 'Mount Mary College, 44 Lab. Arb. 66 (1965).
13 Ingalls Iron Works Co., Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 960 (1959) ; Beech-Nut Life Savers,
Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 1188 (1962).
'4 Appropriately, Nazareth Mills, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 808 (1954) seems to be the
earliest reported case in which an arbitrator held that an employer could not
unilaterally abrogate a long-standing policy of paying Christmas bonuses,
even though nothing in the text of the collective bargaining agreement speci-
fically mandated the retention of existing practices or benefits. See also Stepan
Chemical Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 34 (1965); Pennsylvania Forge Co., 34 Lab. Arb.
732 (1960); Keystone Lighting Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 145 (1963); Tonawanda
Publishing Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 892 (1964); and Budd Co. 36 Lab. Arb. 1335
(1961).
15 Elberta Crate & Box Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 228 (1959); Darling & Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 964 (1962); E. V. Bliss Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 614 (1955); General Cable
Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 780 (1952) ; West Pittston Iron Works, Inc., 3 Lab. Arb.
137 (1944).
16 Lutheran Medical Center, 44 Lab. Arb. 107 (1964).
1 Anaconda Aluminum Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 277 (1965) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 929 (1960); Harnischfeger Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 1329
(1963); International Harvester Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 276 (1953).
3s General Controls Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 240 (1958); Industrial Rayon Corp., 35
Lab. Arb. 228 (1960).
19 Formica Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. 467 (1965).
20 I assume that none of the collective bargaining agreements construed in the
cases cited in notes 12 through 19, supra, contains any provision requiring the
retention of past practices or benefits. In the following cases the opinions
explicitly note the absence of such provisions: Mount Mary College, Nazareth
Mills, Stepan Chenical Co., Pennsylvania Forge Co., Keystone Lighting
Corp., Budd Co., Elberta Crate & Box Co., E. W. Bliss Co., International
Harvester Co., and General Controls Co. The arbitrator in Tonawanda Pub-
lishing Co. observed that the presence or absence of such a provision does not
affect his power to enforce as contractually binding an established practice
of benefit to employees, but pointedly gave no hint as to whether the agree-
ment before him said anything about the retention of past practices or bene-
fits. In the other cases cited in notes 12 through 19, the arbitrators' opinions
do not expressly state whether the agreements contain any provision con-
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Arbitrators traditionally hold these practices to be binding upon the
theory that long-term usage, uniformity of application, and employees'
action in reliance upon the maintenance of existing benefits21 somehow
make them an integral part of the collective bargaining agreement. Of
no concern are provisions that the arbitrator shall not "add to, subtract
from, or modify" any of the terms of the agreement22 or that the writ-
ten text of the agreement constitutes the complete bargain between
the parties and no understanding that is not expressed therein shall
be deemed of any effect.
22
When an arbitrator enforces a past practice he is merely declaring
the industrial "common law of the shop" and, since a collective bar-
gaining agreement is a "generalized code to govern a myriad of cases,"
24
it would seem that this is an appropriate exercise of his power.22 This
cerning past practices or benefits, but their reasoning makes it quite plain
that the agreements did not, in fact, say anything about the question.
1 "Action in reliance," that term so dear to orthodox contract theorists, is
rarely used by labor arbitrators, but it is clear that this is their underlying
notion in many instances. In Mount Mary College, cited in note 12, the arbi-
trator ruled that the employer acted improperly when it discontinued the
practice of giving $50 per month room allowances to two of its power engi-
neers. The employer's reason for the discontinuance of the practice was that
it constituted unwarrantably favorable discrimination in favor of these two
employees; but the arbitrator, having found that the grievants looked upon
the room allowance as part of their total compensation, was unpersuaded by
this argument.
In most of the cases cited in notes 13 through 19, the "action in reliance"
is of a different order. Where a practice of benefit to employees antedated the
execution of the collective bargaining agreement, most arbitrators will reason
that union negotiators, always seeking an increase in benefits, will orient their
demands to the existing structure of wage and other benefits, necessarily as-
suming that the employer will not take away what had previously been given.
Indeed, when an employer specifically requests the discontinuance of such
a practice during negotiations for a new contract, the practice will be deemed
to survive the signing of the new contract unless somewhere in its text ap-
pears forceful evidence of the parties' agreement to its discontinuance. Typi-
cal of this approach is Harnischfeger Corp., cited in note 16, where the arbi-
trator observed:
".. . if the parties had reached a formal understanding during the 1961
negotiations to eliminate the paid wash-up periods, it is difficult to con-
ceive why such understanding was not incorporated into the Agree-
ment. The practice had been in effect for many years and was well known
to all parties concerned. In spite thereof, the Agreement is silent on the
issue. This fact suggests the conclusion that the parties in entering into
the Agreement did so upon the assumption that the existing practice
would continue during the life thereof."
22 Mount Mary College, cited in note 12; Elberta Crate & Box Co., cited in
note 15; Pennsylvania Forge Co., cited in note 14; International Harvester
Co., cited in note 17.
23 Elberta Crate & Box Co., cited in note 15; Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 39
Lab. Arb. 72 (1962) ; Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., cited in note 13; Interna-
tional Harvester Co., cited in note 17.
24 See note 3, supra.
22 United Furniture Workers Local 395 v. Virco Mfg. Corp.,-F. Supp-, 50
L.R.R.M. 2681 (E.D. Ark. 1962); H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers,
Fed. Labor Union 22254, 333 F. 2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964). But see Torrington
Co. v. Metal Products Workers, Local 1645, UAW, AFL-CIO,-F. Supp.-,
60 L.R.R.M. 2262 (D. Conn. 1965), vacating 45 Lab. Arb. 353 (1965). The
District Court's order has been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
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is so because all he is doing is to determine whether, as a matter of
fact, the alleged practice existed and whether its nature and the man-
ner in which it came into and remained in existence entitles it to be
considered a part of the agreement. Once the arbitrator finds that the
practice is contractually binding, it is a necessary conclusion (unless
something in the text of the agreement explicitly renders him impotent)
that he has the authority to order its enforcement.
The Steelworkers trilogy does not, however, really limit the arbi-
trator to the contract (written text, plant rules, established practice)
before him. As long as he makes sure that his "words" do not "manifest
an infidelity" 26 to the text of the collective bargaining agreement, the
"refusal of courts to review the merits" of his award is declared to
be the "proper approach.127 The rationale for this curious form of
judicial restraint is that "The grievance procedure is ... a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process. It, rather than a strike, is
the terminal point of a disagreement.12 These two sentences, which
have been deliberately wrenched from the text of Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion in Warrior & Gulf may well constitute the germinal idea of the
entire trilogy. From this idea stems much of the uncertainty that has
developed in the past five years over the proper ambit of labor arbi-
trators' power.
The unarticulated syllogism that runs through this brief passage
goes as follows: the grievance procedure is part of the collective bar-
gaining process; arbitration is part of the grievance procedure; there-
fore, arbitration is part of the collective bargaining process. The ob-
vious fallacy is that nothing in the major premise requires assent to
the proposition that every aspect of the grievance procedure necessar-
ily has the characteristics of collective bargaining. The major premise
can be taken to mean "some aspects of the grievance procedure are
part of the collective bargaining process" or "all aspects of the griev-
ance procedure are parts of the collective bargaining process." If we
speak of "some aspects," the conclusion is clearly invalid; if we speak
of "all aspects," the major premise is, we shall see, untrue.
It has been held too uniformly to require citation that an employ-
er's refusal to discuss grievances with the union that represents his
employees constitutes a failure to bargain in good faith, a violation of
section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.29 From this it
would seem to follow that the discussion of grievances constitutes part
of the collective bargaining process. From the proposition that an
26 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
27 Id. at 596.
28 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581.
2949 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) (1952). Because of
the honest employment it has afforded to so many, the N.L.R.A. has also been
referred to as the "National Lawyers' Relief Act."
1966]
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employer may be compelled to discuss grievances with a union it does
not, however, follow that he may be compelled to answer them in a
manner that the union will find pleasing.3 0 And even though the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has hinted that it may be an unfair labor
practice for an employer, in the course of negotiations for a new con-
tract, to insist to the point of impasse upon a grievance procedure
under which it would be given unfettered license to alter employees'
working conditions at whim, without effective recourse by the union
to arbitration,3 there can be no doubt that employers and unions are still
free, if they so choose, to execute collective bargaining agreements that
contain no provision whatever for arbitration. That being the case,
it can hardly be maintained that arbitration is a necessary part of the
collective bargaining process.
In a collective bargaining agreement that contains an abitration
provision, the proceeding before the arbitrator, to alter Mr. Justice
Douglas' words, "rather than a strike, is the terminal point of a dis-
agreement." Although strikes are frequently associated with collective
bargaining, I doubt if anyone would seriously affirm that the strike
is a necessary part of the collective bargaining process. The strike or
lockout, far from being part of the collective bargaining process, are
simply economic sanctions employed when that process breaks down.
Similarly, the arbitrator's award cannot properly be viewed as the
culmination of the parties' bargaining at the various stages of the
grievance procedure, for it quite plainly is sought only when the parties
are unable to reach agreement by themselves.
By executing a collective bargaining agreement that contains a
provision for the arbitration of unresolved grievances, the parties bar-
gain for the settlement of their differences by a third person. They
do not, however-for they cannot be sure in advance of the nature
of every future arbitrator's award-agree upon the substance of fu-
ture awards.
In Warrior & Gulf, Mr. Justice Douglas, after noting that the ar-
bitration of grievances is a "major factor in achieving industrial
peace," observed:
Thus the run of arbitration cases . . becomes irrelevant to
our problem. There the choice is between the adjudication of
cases or controversies in courts with established procedures or
even special statutory safeguards on the one hand and the settle-
ment of them in the more informal tribunal on the other. In
30 GLENDOWER. I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
HOTSPUR. Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for them?
-Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 1, 111, i, 53-55
(Oxford ed., 1912)
31 Jacobs Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 35 (1962).
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the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation.
Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since
arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions from
arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hos-
tility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agree-
ments has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes is
part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.32
Equally unfortunate is the assertion that arbitration is a form of
collective bargaining and the notion that "arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife." Certainly the Court does not, in the trilogy, rei er
to that peculiar industrial practice in which, at the expiration ot a
collective agreement, an arbitrator is empowered to fashion a new
agreement for the parties. The discussion, rather, is of arbitration of
grievances that arose during the life of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Since nearly all such agreements contain provisions which ban
strikes or lockouts during their term,33 and since the potential pecuniary
liability consequent upon a strike in breach of contract is generally an
effective deterrent to unions' striking over unresolved grievances, 34 in
what manner may it properly be said that grievance arbitration is a
"substitute for industrial strife?"
The Court's answer seems to be that "industrial strife" is not lim-
ited to direct confrontations between the signatories to a collective
bargaining agreement (lockouts or authorized strikes) but includes as
well the petty dissatisfactions, tensions, flareups of temper, and oc-
casional wildcat work stoppages that occur as the result of friction
between low-level management (foremen and other line supervisors)
and members of the bargaining unit represented by a labor organi-
zation. Thus:
The parties expect that . . . [the arbitrator's] judgment of a
particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says
but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result,
its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' ob-
jective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further
their common goal of uninterrupted production under the aqree-
ment, to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. 35
In Enterprise, Mr. Justice Douglas puts it this way:
[Arbitrators] sit to settle disputes at the plant level-disputes
that require for their solution knowledge of the custom and prac-
32363 U.S. at 578.
33 In 1960, 94% of collective bargaining agreements contained "no-strike" pro-
visions of some sort. Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Relations Expediter
94.
34I do not, of course, speak of those collective agreements which authorize
strikes in protest against the employer's failure satisfactorily to resolve cer-
tain kinds of grievances. See 363 U.S. at 579, n. 5.
-3 363 U.S. at 582.
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tices of a particular factory or of a particular industry as re-
flected in particular agreements.3 6
By way of documentation the Court offers a passage from an article
published in the Harvard Business Review, in which the author makes
the obvious point that to "farmers or professors" factories "seem like
another world.'
37
The function of the labor arbitrator, as the Court sees it, is paternal
rather than judicial. He is more concerned with the easing of tensions
than with the interpretation of a given collective agreement. His job
is to reach a decision that will promote industrial peace-whatever that
means-and thereby insure uninterrupted production.
Implicit in this view is the notion that the day-to-day administrators
of collective bargaining agreements (foremen, personnel managers, shop
stewards, grievance committees, and the like) are incapable of handling
their own affairs in a responsible manner and therefore to be treated
as wards of the industrial state whose father-king is the omniscient
and benevolent arbitrator. With a judicious mixture of rewards and
spankings, one gathers, the arbitrator will keep things going very nicely
indeed.
The trouble with this optimistic formulation is that it doubtless
runs counter to what unions and employers both expect from arbitra-
tion. Although it is certainly true that many grievances are processed
through arbitration for no better reason than that someone wants a
third person, rather than himself, to take the responsibility for a par-
ticular decision; and although the reports are full of cases that concern
rather trivial irritants ;3S the overwhelming majority of arbitrators' de-
cisions involve contract interpretations of profound importance to the
parties' continuing collective relationship.3 9
A decision that a particular employee should not have been dis-
charged for failure to report to work on a snowy day will obviously
influence the employer's conduct when other employees stay home on
36 Id. at 596.
37 Id., n. 2.38 See, for example, Glen Rock Lumber & Supply Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 904 (1962).
The grievant in that case was a shop steward who asserted that it was in-
consistent with the dignity of his position for the employer to compel him
to continue to feed and exercise the employer's German shepherd watchdog.
The arbitrator noted ruefully that the principal party in interest-the dog-
was not represented at the hearing, but sustained the grievance upon the
ground that he lacked jurisdictional power to compel love. He expressed the
hope that the shepherd would respond in a mature way to the end of the
romance.
39 Even the simple discharge case, by fleshing out the term "just cause," serves
as an important gloss upon the written text of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Moreover, it is not uncommon for a union to test the propriety of
some management directive by refusing to comply therewith, thus forcing
the employer to discipline some employee, and enabling the union to bring up
for review in an arbitration on the merits of the disciplinary action the question
of the propriety of the employer's new rule.
[Vol. 49
ARBITRATION
future snowy days. A decision that the employer may not subcontract
a given kind of work once performed by his bargaining unit employees
may substantially affect his power, in the future, to subcontract other
work and may even influence him, when considering the manufacture
of a new product, to erect a new factory solely to avoid having produc-
tion work "locked in" to an existing collective bargaining relationship.
Hundreds of instances could be recited in which an arbitrator's
award that purports to deal with only one specific issue becomes the
authoritative source for the future determination of rights and obliga-
tions of various kinds under a given collective bargaining agreement.
Whatever the issue, it is commonly accepted that an arbitrator's award
not only decides the particular grievance submitted to him, but also
stands as precedent for analogous grievances that may be subsequently
presented to other arbitrators under the same agreement.40 Indeed, an
arbitrator's award construing a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement retains its precedent value after the expiration of the agree-
ment under which the grievance arose, if the parties' subsequent agree-
ment contains an identical provision.
The major respect in which labor arbitration would seem, there-
fore, to differ from commercial arbitration is in the nature of the con-
tractual relationship between the parties and the type of effect, as a
consequence, that the award will have.
The commercial arbitration-whether it relate to the chartering of
a ship, the purchase of goods, or the appraisal of property-stems gen-
erally from a claim of material breach of the underlying contract or
from a desire for the resolution of a dispute as to a material term of
the contract. The commercial arbitration typically results in an award
which can have, as between the parties, no precedent value beyond
the issue presented. Even if the abitrator is asked to fix the respective
shares of the parties in mineral rights to a large tract of land, his
award cannot be said to have the same kind of precedent value that a
labor arbitrator's award has. All that he determines is that A has a
25% interest, B has a 60% interest, and C has a 15% interest. There
401 have used the word "precedent" in a nontechnical way. There is obviously
nothing like stare decisis in the "common law of the shop." Some arbitrators
have pointedly said that they do not feel bound in any manner by decisions
rendered by other arbitrators under the same collective bargaining agree-
ment; but this is the minority view. Most arbitrators, while disclaiming the
binding nature of their predecessors' awards, will in effect accord them the
status of binding precedent by finding them "reasonable" and thus persuasive
or by determining that the award became, in some mystic way, a contractually
binding settlement which they lack power to upset. Responsible representatives
of management and labor will ordinarily prefer the stability of operations that
proceed from uniformity of approach, and will thus treat the arbitrator's
award-without undue speculation on the question of whether they may
properly be compelled to do so-as if it does in fact have precedent value.
Naturally, as in common law litigation, differences will arise concerning the
applicability of an earlier decision to a present factual problem.
19661
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is no question of precedent in the years it takes to exhaust the mineral
wealth of the land: for all time the shares of each of the parties have
been fixed and all that remains to be done is a chore of simple arith-
metic. Of course when the commercial arbitrator is called upon to
determine a claimed breach of a "one-shot" contract, his award can-
not even have prospective effect of this limited kind.
The labor arbitrator, unlike the commercial arbitrator, is generally
asked to decide a claim of contract violation that falls far short of
material breach. The contract before him is a "generalized code" rather
than the tightly drafted instrument one expects to find in commercial
transactions. His award is expected to inform the sketchy outlines of
the agreement before him, to interpret the vague and often clumsy
prose of its text and apply it to a given set of facts in order to define
for the parties acceptable standards of conduct.
In commercial arbitration the parties for one reason or another
agree that their own interests are served better by a reference to the
informal arbitral forum than by insistence upon the procedural safe-
guards afforded by the courts. The issue, generally, is a dispute over
money; and in many instances business prudence may suggest that the
lack of predictibility4" inherent in arbitration is outweighed by the
speed and cheapness of the arbitral process. The loser in a commercial
arbitration, having voluntarily agreed to accept an unpredictible de-
termination, should not be allowed to complain because the determina-
tion has gone against him, unless his loss is occasioned by circumstances
that are so clearly outrageous as to transcend the expectations of one
who in good faith contracts to have the merits of his claim determined
by an impartial person. This policy is embodied in the general arbitra-
tion statutes, under which awards may be set aside only for the most
egregious kinds of misconduct on the arbitrator's part.4 2
There is rarely, in labor relations, the same kind of voluntary
contracting that underlies the commercial arbitration. The duty to
bargain collectively with the representative of his employees is im-
posed upon the employer by legislative fiat and, all too often, enjoined
upon him by a court of appeals enforcing an order of the National
Labor Relations Board. The commercial agreement, at the time of
its inception, is hopefully a marriage of true minds; collective bargain-
ing is by definition a shotgun arrangement.
Given the obvious pressures of labor-management negotiations and
the steady deterioration of English prose usage, it is no wonder that
41 Ordinarily, an arbitrator's award will not be vacated merely because it is
founded upon errors of law or of fact. See. e.g., American Machine & Foundry
Co. v. UAW, Local 116,-F. Supp.-, 54 L.R.R.M\. 2184 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
aff'd, 329 F. 2d 147 (2d Cir. 1964).
42 See, for example, §10 of the U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (1952).
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collective bargaining agreements are generally clumsy, inarticulate,
replete with provisions that are mutually contradictory. In their haste
to arrive at agreement on the so-called "economic" issues that are of
most immediate interest to their boards of directors or their member-
ships, the negotiators of collective bargaining agreements produce
writings that would horrify a meticulous draftsman. As Mr. Justice
Douglas puts it:
Because of the compulsion to reach agreement and the breadth
of the matters covered, as well as the need for a fairly concise
and readable instrument, the product of negotiations (the written
document) is, in the words of the late Dean Shulman, "a com-
pilation of diverse provisions; some provide objective criteria
almost automatically applicable; some provide more or less spe-
cific standards which require reason and judgment in their
application; and some do little more than leave problems to
future consideration with an expression of hope and good
faith."4"
If we accept the Supreme Court's assertion that parties to a col-
lective bargaining agreement contemplate, at the time of execution,
that the sketchy text of their written contract will be given life by
arbitrators' awards to be subsequently rendered, we should expect that
they so agree upon the assumption that the arbitrators who render
opinions under their agreement will do so not only impartially, but also
with some degree of competence and in a way that can be reasonably
anticipated. They in effect agree to the resolution of certain disputes
that might thereafter arise between them in a manner consonant with
the resolution of similar disputes under collective bargaining agree-
ments that contain similar provisions. They agree that arbitrators'
awards to be rendered under their collective bargaining agreement will
have some kind of precedent value in the emerging common law of
their industrial establishment.
If that indeed be the nature of the agreement between parties to
a collective bargaining agreement that contains a broad arbitration pro-
vision, this question presents itself: Is the "refusal of courts to review
the merits of an arbitration award" really the proper approach?
II
The award of a labor arbitrator is generally terse; several sen-
tences will usually suffice. The resolution of a grievance concerning
the proper aspect of some principle of seniority may be in a-1 award
that says simply:
Dawe was improperly laid off on January 3, 1965. He
should have been transferred laterally to the job in classifica-
tion no. 185 in Department L now held bv Watkins. Emplover
43 363 U.S. at 580.
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is required to place Dawe in the said job forthwith, and to
make him whole for any loss of earnings he sustained as a
result of the improper layoff. The arbitrator retains jurisdiction
of this case for a period of 60 days to allow the Company and
Union to enter a stipulation as to the amount of back pay due
to Dawe. Failing agreement, subsequent hearings will be ar-
ranged at a mutually convenient time, upon the application of
either party.
We note first of all that there are two losers in this award: the em-
ployer, who may owe Dawe a substantial amount of money, and Wat-
kins, who for all we know may have lost his job. It is apparent that the
property rights determined in this everyday kind of arbitration can be
of staggering importance to those who are most directly involved; it
is hard to believe that Watkins can find any therapeutic value in the
arbitrator's award which removed him from his job.44
Harsh as the award's necessary consequence upon Watkins may be,
we can find no fault With it if the arbitrator's determination justly
applies the seniority provisions of the collective agreement before him.
For we are here concerned not with some cozy easing of tensions, but
with what must have been a matter of paramount importance to both
employees, as well as one which involved substantial pecuniary ex-
posure on the employer's part. Each of the parties desired justice from
the arbitrator; and one hopes that justice was in fact rendered.
Upon the face of the award, it is not immediately apparent what
the union's interest was in this case. There is no need to assume that
Dawe is related to the shop chairman's wife or that Watkins welched
on a poker debt. Grievances like Dawe's are presented hundreds of
times a day in plants all over the country; and if they seem to be of
at least colorable merit, will be processed through arbitration by union
leaders who are terrified by the prospect of being charged with the
breach of some duty of fair representation should they fail to go to
arbitration.
The prime interest of the union in the Dawe-Watkins case will of
course be the application of seniority principles in as uniform a manner
as possible consistently with its own view as to the relative importance
of certain criteria (length of service as opposed to skill and ability, for
example). To determine what effect the Dawe-Watkins decision has
upon the application of seniority principles throughout the plant, both
employer and union rely upon the opinion which accompanies the ar-
bitrator's award. The reasoning contained in that opinion should serve
as guidelines to both parties, preventing not only some future relitiga-
tion of a Dawe-Watkins situation, but also clarifying the proper applica-
44 See Black, J., dissenting in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, -U.S.-, 13 L.
Ed. 2d 580, 587 (1965).
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tion of seniority principles in quite different, but analogous, situations.
Let us imagine that the employer and union signed their first col-
lective bargaining agreement on January 2, 1965- the day before
Dawe's layoff. Suppose that the Dawe-Watkins case was the first
grievance presented to an arbitrator in the infancy of the parties' col-
lective bargaining relationship. The decision now becomes a truly
prodigious source of precedent to be followed by subsequent arbitrators.
The arbitrator has nonchalantly accorded himself the powers of in-
junction and of the assessment of damages; doubtless unaided by any-
thing in the collective bargaining agreement, he has magnified his
jurisdictional power in an effort to induce the parties to work out a
mutually acceptable disposition of the back pay issue. And, of course, it
very well may be that the contract's seniority article was silent as to
what sorts of transfers might be appropriate in lieu of layoff: the lateral
"bump" may be the product of the arbitrator's filling the holes in a
Swiss cheese document.
The important moral of Dawe-Watkins is that the major objectives
which both employers and unions seek in arbitration are predictibility
and justice. By "predictibility" is meant simply the existence of a
tradition of decisional approach that is sufficiently well established to
enable one to guess intelligently how most arbitrators would respond to
a given set of facts. "Justice" is a much harder term to define.
Two recent publications, one concerned with predictibility, the other
with justice, demonstrate the kinds of problems that beset labor arbi-
tration today. The picture of the arbitral process that emerges is some-
what less than flattering.
Solution to 3500 Labor Problems,45 a kind of digest to the bound
volumes of Commerce Clearing House's arbitration service, purports
to be an infallible guide to the proper conduct of labor relations. With
this book, the publisher tells us, the doubts and uncertainties which
plague harried labor relations personnel will be banished: thirty-five
hundred clear-cut and definitive answers are presented that perforce
will be followed by every arbitrator called upon to decide any grievance.
This new two-volume trouble shooter shows you what's been
done in thirty-five hundred different labor dispute situations. It
represents the distillation of the considered judgment of more
than two hundred labor law experts who've been called on to
resolve 3,500 different labor problems as they actually oc-
curred. . . . All you have to do is scan the subject lists, flip
through the alphabetized pages, find the problem parallelling
yours and you're in instant touch with the precedent-setting
decision of an experienced authority.46
45 Two volumes. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1965.
46 Undated flyer, signed by James A. Merchant for CCH Products Company, a
division of Commerce Clearing House, Inc., publisher of SOLUTIONS TO
3500 LABOR PROBLEMIS.
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We live in the age of the instant banana and the prefabricated
martini. The University of Chicago Press offers the Hundred Great
Books, which somehow manage to contain 101 Great Ideas. Solutions
to 3500 Labor Problems is both symptomatic of the intellectual flab-
biness that is so firmly entrenched in the Great Society and of the
quest for definition in an area where definition is, perhaps, unattainable.
If the book were simply a digest of certain bound volumes of the
publisher's labor arbitration reporter, it would be perfectly defensible.
The type is readable; the arrangement of topics is convenient; and
the breadth of coverage is fairly representative of the everyday griev-
ances determined by labor arbitrators.
But we are promised more. The cases digested, we are told, are
"precedent-setting"; all one has to do is to fit a factual situation within
the terms of a digested case; close one's mind, and, presto! an answer
comes forth. The assumption is that arbitrators, as a rule, act as if
there is some kind of nationwide common law of grievance resolution;
that one arbitrator's settlement of a grievance at one plant will, by
virtue of a process in some way analogous to stare decisis, influence
other arbitrators at different plants to decide similar grievances in
similar ways.
The trouble, of course, is that this kind of comforting uniformity
is by definition unavailable in labor arbitration. Different norms of
conduct are required in different industries; among different employers
in the same industry; and often among different departments of a single
employer's bargaining unit. Smoking on the job in a sheet metal assem-
bly operation may warrant a disciplinary warning, or at worst, a suspen-
sion of employment for several days, but even the first offense of
smoking in a petrochemicals plant may justify immediate discharge. A
truck driver's fondness for Anglo-Saxon expletives in addressing
motorists may perhaps be one of the virtues required for the per-
formance of his job; but surely one hopes for gentler speech from the
mouths of school bus drivers.
As desirable as may be uniformity of approach among arbitrators,
it is unthinkable that there can be anything like the instant "solutions"
to labor problems which Commerce Clearing House so proudly offers.
There may be, however, generally accepted standards of arbitral ap-
proach; and the parties to a labor agreement are entitled to believe
that the man they have selected-whether as umpire or as ad hoc
arbitrator-will bring to bear upon the problem before him an aware-
ness of, and commitment to, the tradition in which he is working.
Although the various decisions handed down by arbitrators in a given
plant form the common law of that shop, decisions handed down else-
where are no more than part of a developing tradition, an index to
the current thinking of labor relations experts which may or may not
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be persuasive on the factual issue immediately at hand. The parties
to a collective bargaining agreement therefore seek predictibility in
the sense that they expect that arbitrators will be guided by the develop-
ing tradition or arbitral case law when they decide question of first
impression under their agreement; and they expect that in other cases,
arbitrators will act like common law judges.
But predictibility is not the only virtue sought in arbitrators. We
expect as well that perhaps indefinable quality of justice. A seemingly
orthodox decision may work manifest injustice, while an idosyncratic
opinion may effect substantial justice upon the immediate question pre-
sented without doing violence to the common law of the shop. Fre-
quently a decision will not only be eccentric but also unjust.
Suppose a manufacturer of wooden furniture were to discharge a
cabinet maker who had been in its employ for thirty years and whose
personnel record was exemplary, for the sole reason that he came to
work twenty minutes late on the day after his youngest daughter's
wedding. No arbitrator, one should like to think, would sustain such
a discharge. And yet, although this instance is imaginary, the labor
arbitration reports are full of decision that seem equally unjust.
The proliferation of weird decisions from arbitrators has been in-
creasingly a matter of concern. In a recent article, Judge Paul R.
Hays expressed this gloomy thought:
Pending scholarly studies and evaluations, I am forced to
the conclusion, based upon observation during twenty-three years
of very active practice in the area of arbitration and as an
arbitrator, and from suggestions in the more intelligent litera-
ture in this field, that labor arbitration has fatal shortcomings
as a "system for the judicial administration of contract viola-
tions," since this is, I believe, all that is basically claimed for
it. An arbitrator is a third party called in to determine a con-
troversy over whether one of the parties to the collective bar-
gaining agreement has violated that agreement. He is not a wise
counsellor and statesman to whom the management and the
union look for advice on how to run their affairs or how to
increase production or lessen tensions. He is merely an ad hoc
judge to whom is submitted the question of whether the collective
bargaining agreement has been violated. The chances are very
good that, in all but a tiny percentage of arbitrations, this is
the first time he has had anything to do with the plant, and
that he knows nothing of the background of the dispute or of
the "common law" of the industry. In fact there is a consider-
able possibility that this is his first arbitration case. . ..
There are only a handful of arbitrators who, like Shulman
and Cox, have the knowledge, training, skill, and character
which would make them good judges and therefore make them
good arbitrators. In literally thousands of cases every year de-
cisions are made by arbitrators who are wholly unfitted for
their jobs, who do not have the requisite knowledge, training,
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skill, intelligence and character. In fact, a proportion of arbitra-
tion awards, no one knows how large a proportion, is decided
not on the basis of the evidence or of the contract or other
proper considerations, but in a way calculated to encourage the
arbitrator's being hired for other arbitration cases. It makes no
difference whether or not a large majority of cases is decided
in this way. A system of adjudication in which the judge de-
pends for his livelihood, or even for substantial supplements to
his regular income, on pleasing those who hire him to judge is
per se a thoroughly undesirable system. In no proper system of
justice should a judge be submitted to such pressures; on the
contrary, a judge should be carefully insulated from any pres-
sures of this type. There are many discussions of arbitration
which do not mention this aspect of the process. In my opinion
no discussion of arbitration which does not consider the effect
of the arbitrator's dependence on the good will of the parties
is completely honest.
4 7
Convinced that "labor arbitration is a usually undesirable and fre-
quently intolerable procedure,"48s Judge Hays toys briefly with the
idea of specialized labor courts as an alternative, but expresses doubt
that any expertise other than that generally expected of judges is really
needed. He notes that in recent years courts have decided, under col-
lective bargaining agreements that contain no provision for arbitration,
the same kinds of issues as those generally submitted to arbitrators ;49
and concludes:
I would be content, therefore, with a procedural reform which
would make available for such case a simple, speedy, and inex-
pensive remedy. If the suggestion of a procedure like that of
a small claims court does not satisfy these requirements, then I
suggest as an alternative a procedure along the lines of the New
York Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Dis-
putes.50 That procedure could be specified in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and the promise to submit to it would be
specifically enforceable. The action is commenced without the
service of a summons and without pleadings by the filing of a
statement setting forth the issues ("claims and defenses"). A
submission to this simplified procedure constitutes a waiver
of trial by jury. At the hearing, rules as to the admissibility of
evidence are dispensed with. The court may hold a pre-trial
hearing and may direct pre-trial discovery and the taking of
depositions. Although the New York simplified procedure per-
mits no appeal, I would allow appeals in this area upon per-
mission of the Court of Appeals. 5
1
It is plain that Judge Hays would throw out the baby with the water.
4 Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L. J. 1019, 1034-1035 (1965).
48 Id. at 1035.
9 Id. at 1021-1022.
50 Judge Hays, in a footnote reference at this point of his text, cites the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules, §§3031-3037.
51 74 YALE L. J. at 1037.
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III
Presumably most labor lawyers will agree that the rosy accounts of
arbitration that appear in the self-congratulatory publications of the
National Academy of Arbitrators go a bit far. Arbitrators, being men,
are fallible: that proposition does not, however, warrant Judge Hays'
conclusion that labor arbitration is a procedure that should be junked
as efficiently and as brutally as possible.
If what is really desired in the resolution of grievances is a rea-
sonable degree of predictibility as well as substantial justice, the most
sensible inquiry, one would think, is whether those ends can be realized
within the existing framework of labor arbitration as it has developed
in the past two decades. If some tinkering with the present machinery
can produce the desired results, it is certainly poor economy to insist
upon relegating it to the scrap heap.
Apart from this consideration, other strictures can be inveighed
against Judge Hays' approach. One may assume that Judge Hays is
correct when he speculates that thousands of arbitral decisions are
rendered annually by incompetent arbitrators, but it is difficult to see
how it necessarily follows that all judges are competent to render ade-
quate decision on grievances that arise under collective bargaining agree-
ments. Investiture in judicial robes does not constitute immunization
from sloth, corruption, or just plain stupidity. Even the wisest judges
err; and it is for this reason that we require some right of review of
the decisions of judges and administrative tribunals.
By way of substitute for the arbitral process as it now exists, Judge
Hays suggests something like the "simplified procedure for court de-
termination of disputes" now available under the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules. Apart from the fact that no congruent pro-
cedure is available in the federal courts-and it is the federal judiciary,
after all, who are to fashion the new common law of the collective
bargaining agreement 52-- the crucial flaw in his reasoning is that it
would provide no realistic alternative to the decisional quirks that
make the process of labor arbitration too often fraught with exaspera-
tion. If appeals from the court which decided a labor grievance were
allowed only with the leave of an appellate court,53 a party who feels
himself wronged by the court's decision will probably have no more
adequate chance of vacating the judgment than, under present law, he
would have of vacating an arbitrator's award. Since, as Judge Hays
52 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,456 (1957).
53 judge Hays apparently misreads the New York statute when he observes
that "the New York simplified procedure permits no appeal." Section 3037 of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules authorizes appeals from final judgments
or from orders "determining the making of the contract or submission or
the failure to comply therewith." Interlocutory orders that do not determine
the making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply therewith
may also be appealed, but only with leave of the court.
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notes, the rules of evidence are ignored in the "simplified" court pro-
cedure, it would seem that the major difference between arbitration
and the kind of forum that he proposes is that one is not generally
allowed to smoke in a courtroom.
When they select an arbitrator to resolve their dispute, the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement generally assume that the man
they have chosen, if not an "expert," is to some degree conversant with
problems similar to the one presented to him. They assume that his
experience in dealing with problems of labor relations will enable him
to grasp the gist of the question before him upon "proof" that is
sketchy or inarticulate. In most cases, labor arbitrations are tried not
by lawyers, but by personnel managers and union representatives. For
some reason, most employers and most unions prefer it this way; and
in speculating about any system for the "judicial" resolution of their
disputes, the habits and preferences of the parties should be taken into
consideration.
Assume that under some "simplified" court procedure, a judge were
called upon to determine whether a time value set for the performance
of a certain task upon a certain set of machines was too low to enable
the grievant to earn the incentive bonus contemplated under the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Rules of evidence or no, the judge will
doubtless be completely at sea when the "claims and defenses" are
presented to him. In order to arrive at an intelligent decision, he will
probably insist upon lengthy (if not formal) articulation of the parties'
positions, and will probably also require the assistance of expert testi-
mony. The imagination boggles at the length of time it would take to
try a run-of-the-mill time value grievance in a court of law.
There are, however, grievances over issues that are more in line
with questions that may be reasonably expected to arise in general
litigation. An employee discharged for gambling may claim that the
employer fired the wrong man: getting at the truth, in a case like this,
will obviously involve precisely the same processes that are ordinarily
called into play in the resolution before a court of any factual dispute.
In this sort of grievance, dispensing with the rules of evidence would
be equally intolerable in the arbitral and the judicial forum.
The two examples just given present two vastly different, yet tire-
somely familiar, kinds of grievances that are ordinarily decided by labor
arbitrators. It is hard to imagine that anyone who does not possess
considerable expertise in labor relations will be able to render a fair
decision on the time value grievance with anything remotely resembling
expedition. No amount of labor expertise, however, can be deemed a
reliable substitute for the careful sifting of evidence that would be
required for a just decision to be reached in the gambling case.
It would seem, therefore, that the substitution of a "simplified"
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court procedure for arbitration would create more problems than it
would solve. Where shorthand proof is desirable, the technical com-
plexities of the problem would require most judges to hold cumber-
some and time-consuming hearings; where lies are to be sorted from
half-truths, the dispensing with the rules of evidence might constitute
a license for perjury and would certainly sorely affect the rights of
the individuals most intimately concerned in the outcome of the
litigation.
What is needed is a less drastic reform than that proposed by
Judge Hays, but one that is reasonably calculated to promote the ends
of predictibility and justice in labor arbitration. The author is in basic
agreement with the Supreme Court that, under the usual broad arbi-
tration provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement, every
grievance that is not specifically exempted from arbitration by a writ-
ten provision of the agreement should be deemed arbitrable on the
merits25 That does not mean, for the reasons suggested, that there
should be no efficacious means of reviewing a labor arbitrator's award.
Labor arbitration, as we have seen, differs in certain fundamental
respects from commercial arbitration. The general arbitration statutes
were framed with commercial arbitration in mind; and the very limited
grounds they allow for vacating an arbitrator's award should properly
have no application in the context of labor arbitration.
There is some evidence that a re-thinking of the validity of the
Steelworkers trilogy is taking place in the Supreme Court ;55 and it is
suggested the case which most warrants reevaluation is the Enterprise
decision, in which the Court held that "refusal of courts to review the
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach."
The best interests of all concerned would be served by a repudia-
tion of Enterprise and the authorization of full review-to the same
degree that an appellate court will review the judgement of an
inferior court sitting without a jury-of arbitrators' awards. Review
could be obtained upon a simple motion brought in a district court,
utilizing the procedures of the U.S. Arbitration Act and invoking
special federal question jurisdiction under §301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947.
This suggestion, if followed, would bring about an increase in the
number of arbitrators' awards that are sought to be vacated, but prob-
ably not a very substantial increase. Arbitrators who today are given free
rein to practice decisional whimsy will no doubt be more chary about
54 It is not clear whether the Supreme Court still adheres to this view. See In-
dependent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F. 2d 903 (7th Cir.
1963), aff'd by equally divided court, 379 U.S. 130 (1964). Cf. Torrington
Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645, UAW, 237 F. Supp. 139(D. Conn. 1965), rev'd, 347 F. 2d 93 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940
(1965).
55 See cases cited in note 54, supra.
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the application of their "own brand of industrial jnstice" when they
realize that their decisions, like those of judges, can be set aside be-
cause of errors of law or of factual determination. The existence of
a meaningful power of review should reduce significantly the number
of awards that cry out for reversal. Arbitrators' livelihoods, as Judge
Hays points out, are at the pleasure of those whom they judge; and
it is certain that no party to a collective bargaining agreement would
for long expend money upon an arbitrator whose decisions are fre-
quently set aside.
